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Craig Martin buys a brand new car, complete with the latest edition of 
Firestone all-weather tires.  Months later, Craig  reads in the newspaper that a 
class action lawsuit has been filed against Firestone on behalf of fifteen million 
tire purchasers, alleging that the manufacturer’s latest tire rollout had been 
defectively designed and now poses a significant hazard to consumers.  
Months later, Craig  receives a confusing postcard.  This postcard informs him 
that the case has been settled, and if he has an original receipt of his tire pur-
chase, he may apply online within the next month for a coupon good for a ten 
dollar rebate from his next in-store purchase of Firestone tires, something he has 
no interest in.  His right to sue Firestone independently has been automatically 
waived.  He later learns that his attorney, whom he has never met, spoken to, 
or heard from, has earned nineteen million dollars from the settlement.  Craig 
Martin now has a set of potentially deadly tires, a complicated set of directions 
to recoup ten dollars from the cost of the expensive replacement tires that he 
must now buy, and the infuriating realization that his “advocate” has walked 
away with a windfall.1  
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 1 This account is a fictional example adapted from an actual case, Shields v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., No. E-0167637 (Tex. Dist. Ct. July 31, 2002).  See infra notes 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) 
primarily to expand federal jurisdiction over multi-state class action 
lawsuits and to limit unfair class action practices that inflicted con-
centrated damage upon absent class members.2  By passing CAFA, 
Congress purportedly desired to “assure fair and prompt recoveries 
for class members with legitimate claims,”3 to restore the constitu-
tional intent of the framers to provide for “[f]ederal court considera-
tion of interstate cases of national importance under diversity juris-
diction,”4 and to “benefit society by encouraging innovation and 
lowering consumer prices.”5
CAFA covers a broad spectrum of issues designed to promote ef-
ficiency and uphold fairness of class action litigation, as a result of 
specific congressional findings that “abuses of the class action device 
have harmed class members with legitimate claims,”6 and have “un-
dermined public respect for the [American] judicial system”7 by 
awarding class counsel large fees,8 “while leaving class members with  
. . . little or no” meaningful compensation for their alleged injuries.9  
One such abuse, demonstrated above,10 commonly occurs in the form 
of “coupon settlements,” whereby class counsel and defendants agree 
to distribute to class members coupons, discounts, or credits on a 
product or service offered by the defendants in lieu of a cash award.11  
Attorneys representing the class, on the other hand, receive attor-
ney’s fees in cash, based on a percentage of the aggregate face value 
of the coupon settlement.12  The coupon settlement innovation is jus-
tifiably a cause for concern—the very party accused of legal transgres-
sions stands to benefit (perhaps even profit) from increased sales, 
 2 John F. Harris, Victory for Bush on Suits: New Law to Limit Class-Action Cases, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2005, at A1. 
 3 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(1), 119 Stat. 4, 5 
(2005). 
 4 Id. § 2(b)(2). 
 5 Id. § 2(b)(3). 
 6 Id. § 2(a)(2)(A). 
 7 Id. § 2(a)(2)(C). 
 8 Id. § 2(a)(3)(A). 
 9 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(3)(A), 119 Stat. 4, 
5 (2005). 
 10 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 11 Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements: The Emperor’s Clothes 
of Class Actions, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1343, 1344 (2005). 
 12 Id.  Valuation of coupon settlements and the attorney’s fees tied to them are a 
major focus of CAFA, and will be discussed more thoroughly in Parts III and IV, infra. 
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while class members, allegedly harmed by the defendant, continue to 
be inexorably tethered to the defendant.13
To ameliorate the fundamentally unfair coupon settlement prac-
tices14 that pierced the class action landscape upon the genesis of 
coupon settlements in the early 1990s,15 Congress ratified a “Con-
sumer Class Action Bill of Rights” within CAFA,16 which created the 
central mechanism designed to correct the Coupon Settlement Prob-
lem (as well as other settlement process issues).17  The primary objec-
tive of the Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights is to limit the exorbi-
tant fees class counsel were obtaining from coupon settlements by 
mandating that fees be calculated on a basis commensurate with the 
actual value of the proposed settlement.18  Specifically, the Act directs 
that fees be based on the value of coupons that are actually re-
deemed, and not the theoretical face value of the aggregate coupon 
offering in which a significant number of absent class members are 
unlikely ever to acquire.19
CAFA endeavors to solve the Coupon Settlement Problem by 
implementing a market mechanism designed to provide incentives to 
attorneys to increase the value of individual coupons in a proposed 
settlement (thus increasing the amount of redeemed coupons and, in 
turn, attorney’s fees).20  Unfortunately, this solution is unlikely to be 
effective.  As this Comment argues, the Act’s attorney’s fees provi-
sions are far from airtight and are susceptible to lawyerly circumven-
tion.21  Additionally, this Comment contends that CAFA’s judicial re-
 13 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 
2005, at 10 (2005), available at http://www.classactionprofessor.com/cafa-analysis. 
pdf; see also The Use of “Coupon” Compensation and Other Non-Pecuniary Redress, 18 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1161, 1168 (2005) [hereinafter FTC Workshop]. 
 14 This Comment refers to the issue presented by unfair coupon settlements as 
the “Coupon Settlement Problem.” 
 15 See Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1344; see also Analysis: Class Action Litiga-
tion—A Federalist Society Survey, Part II, CLASS ACTION WATCH, Spring 1999, at 5–12, 
available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070321_classaction12.pdf (detailing 
survey of generally perceived increases in class action litigation during the 1990s). 
 16 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 3(a), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1711–1715 (West 
2007).  Section 3 of CAFA amends Title 28 of the United States Code by inserting §§ 
1711–1715.  The focus of this Comment is on § 1712, which deals with coupon set-
tlements in general.  To a more specific level, this Comment scrutinizes § 1712(e), 
dealing with judicial scrutiny of proposed coupon settlements.  See infra Parts III.B 
and IV.B. 
 17 Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 10. 
 18 Id. at 11. 
 19 Id. 
 20 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(a)–(e). 
 21 See infra Part IV.A. 
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view guideline, which professes to direct the court in its assessment of 
a proposed coupon settlement, provides an insufficient backstop for 
unfair settlement proposals.22  A district judge may only approve a 
coupon settlement upon a written finding that it is “fair, reasonable, 
and adequate for class members.”23  This scrutiny standard is virtually 
identical to the language of Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which calls for a fairness hearing before a proposed class 
action settlement can be approved.24  However, because trial judges 
regularly approved unfair coupon settlements prior to the enactment 
of CAFA,25 there is no reason to believe that the substantively identi-
cal review standard will prevent the qualification of similarly inequi-
table settlement proposals.  Additionally, CAFA’s jurisdictional ex-
pansion principles will transfer even more class action cases in which 
a coupon settlement is proposed into federal courts,26 further increas-
ing the likelihood of federal court approval of iniquitous coupon set-
tlements. 
This Comment asserts that in the coupon settlement context, 
CAFA’s judicial scrutiny provision provides substandard protection to 
class members given the history of fundamentally unfair awards to 
 22 See infra Part IV.B. 
 23 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(e). 
 24 See infra Parts III, IV. The only difference between the two standards is that 
CAFA mandates the finding be in writing.  Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), with 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1712(e). 
 25 Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185, 200 
(2006) (stating that “courts often give settlements only a perfunctory review, result-
ing in inadequate protection of absent class members’ interests”); see also Linda S. 
Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy in Litigation 
and Settlement Classes, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687, 1692 (2004).  Professor Mullenix states: 
[C]ourts pay lip service to the concept of adequate representation but 
fail to robustly engage in any meaningful inquiry to establish the exis-
tence of such adequate representation. For judges, the adequacy in-
quiry usually is the least-rigorously examined requirement for certifica-
tion, either for litigation or for settlement classes. Instead, courts 
routinely wave their blessings over class counsel and proposed class 
representatives and presumptively make findings of adequacy on non-
existent or scant factual showings. 
Id.  This argument can plausibly be extended to the adequacy review of proposed set-
tlements.  See infra Parts III.A and IV.B. 
 26 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §§ 4–5, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(d), 1453 
(West 2007).  The expansion of federal court jurisdiction over multi-state class ac-
tions is relevant to this Comment insofar as the number of class actions that were 
previously filed in state court before the passage of CAFA will now be scrutinized by 
federal courts.  Thus, a description of CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions is provided in 
Part II.A, infra. 
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those absent litigants.27  By focusing almost exclusively on attorney’s 
fees,28 Congress ignored the fact that there is no indication that re-
straining excessive fees necessarily precludes class counsel and de-
fendants from agreeing on a mutually beneficial bargain that hurts 
absent class members.  While the Act may or may not effectively limit 
excessive attorney’s fees, it does little with respect to substantive pro-
tections for absent class members.  Given those flaws, the Act should 
have incorporated a more exacting standard of settlement review.  
This Comment argues that, as codified, CAFA’s judicial review stan-
dard lacks the foundation to mount an adequate second line of de-
fense.  Hence, CAFA is incapable of achieving its stated objectives. 
Because the judicial scrutiny standard provided in CAFA does 
not adequately protect absent class members where a coupon settle-
ment is proposed, the Act should be amended.  An amendment to 
CAFA providing district judges with a test that presumptively invali-
dates all coupon settlements would realistically enable the Act to filter 
out the substantively harmful settlement proposals, thus restoring 
fundamental fairness to the class action system.29
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part II describes the class 
action mechanism and discusses the Coupon Settlement Problem by 
exploring attorneys’ inherent economic incentives that give rise to 
the problem, as well as judicial review over class action settlement 
proposals.  Part II also demonstrates the Coupon Settlement Problem 
by providing specific examples of coupon settlements that have un-
dermined the interests of absent class members. 
Part III discusses CAFA’s relevant provisions and how the Act at-
tempts to solve the Coupon Settlement Problem.  Particularly, Part III 
fleshes out the statutory device designed to provide relief to absent 
class members by tying attorney’s fees to a more realistic valuation of 
the proposed coupon settlement.  In addition, Part III outlines 
CAFA’s jurisdictional rule changes for interstate class actions. Finally, 
this Part explicates the Act’s judicial scrutiny provision devised as a 
supervisory instrument to ensure sufficient relief to absent class mem-
bers. 
Part IV examines why CAFA, as written, does not provide satis-
factory protection for absent class members.  Due to the inadequate 
oversight provision in the legislation, reviewing judges are just as apt 
 27 See John H. Beisner, Matthew Shors & Jessica Davidson Miller, Class Action 
“Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1446–50 (2006) 
(reviewing historical inequities of various coupon settlement proposals). 
 28 See Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 11. 
 29 See infra Part V.A. 
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to rubber-stamp a substantively unfair coupon settlement proposal as 
they were before CAFA was enacted.  This section supports this con-
tention by elucidating a number of theoretical and practical concerns 
with the Act’s judicial scrutiny standard, as well as CAFA’s fees-related 
provisions.  Part IV concludes by arguing that because CAFA is un-
able to ensure truly valuable relief to injured class members, the Act 
should be amended to empower the legislation that is, at least in the-
ory, beneficial to the individuals who are most in need of judicial pro-
tection. 
Finally, Part V proposes and explains an amendment to CAFA 
that would best rectify the Act’s shortcomings.  Specifically, Part V ar-
gues that the Act should be amended to include a strong yet rebut-
table presumption against all proposed coupon settlements.  Pursu-
ant to this proposed amendment, a judge should allow the settlement 
to proceed only upon a collective showing by class counsel and de-
fendants that there is a bona fide rationale for structuring a particu-
lar settlement to include coupons instead of cash, and that such a 
proposal does in fact provide substantive value to class members 
commensurate with their alleged injuries.30  By constructing a more 
restrictive judicial filter, the Act would better accomplish the goals it 
seeks to attain.  Part V also briefly spells out several competing theo-
ries on how best to perfect CAFA’s coupon provisions, and argues 
why a rebuttable presumption against all proposed coupon settle-
ments would best revamp the legislation’s deficiencies. 
II. CLASS ACTIONS AND THE COUPON SETTLEMENT PROBLEM 
A. The Class Action Device 
Simply stated, class actions are representative, large-scale lawsuits 
in which the rights of many people are adjudicated in a single pro-
ceeding.31  They function to protect defendants from inconsistent ju-
dicial obligations, to protect the interests of absentee litigants, to pro-
vide “a convenient and economical means for disposing of similar 
lawsuits,” and to facilitate “the spreading of litigation costs among 
numerous litigants with similar claims.”32  In order to understand the 
full dimensions of the Coupon Settlement Problem, it is necessary to 
first explore the roles of the stakeholders in class action litigation. 
 30 See infra Part V.A. 
 31 Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 2. 
 32 U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 403 (1980). 
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Since 1966, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has 
governed federal class action litigation.33  The rule “permits single-
action litigation of multiple claims involving similar or identical  
questions of law and fact that arise from a common set of operative 
facts. . . .  [It] constitutes an exception to the usual rule that litigation 
is conducted by, on behalf of, or against the named parties only.”34  
Class actions benefit plaintiffs because collective litigation of a large 
number of common claims “afford aggrieved persons a remedy when 
it is not economically feasible to obtain relief through the traditional 
framework of multiple individual damage actions as, for example, 
when each claim involves only a small dollar amount.”35  On the other 
hand, defendants view class action litigation as a means of 
“provid[ing] a single proceeding in which to determine the merits of 
the plaintiffs’ claims and . . . [as] protect[ion] . . . from repeated and 
potentially inconsistent adjudications.”36
Because absent class members do not play a direct participatory 
role in the representative litigation, Rule 23 sets forth stringent 
guidelines for whether and when a complaint may be certified as a 
class action so as to ensure that absent class members’ best interests 
are protected.37  The rule “attempts to balance judicial efficiency of 
litigation by or against classes against fairness and due process con-
cerns, and does so by providing procedures and safeguards designed 
to ensure fair and adequate protection of the interests of absentee 
 33 FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 
(1997) (explaining the “innovative” revisions of the class action mechanism); see gen-
erally Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 375–400 (1967) (summarizing 
and commenting on the 1966 amendments to the Rules). 
 34 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.02 (3d ed. 1998) 
(citing Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 (1982); Am. Pipe & 
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974); Eyak Native Vill. v. Exxon Corp., 25 
F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 35 Id. (quoting Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) 
(“Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional frame-
work of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be 
without any effective redress unless they may employ the class action device.”)). 
 36 Id. (quoting Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 402–03 (“The justifications that led to the de-
velopment of the class action include the protection of the defendant from inconsis-
tent obligations . . . .”); First Fed. Bank v. Barrow, 878 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(“The absence of class certification in the instant case would have precipitated a mul-
titude of separate actions against the individual members of the certified classes 
which would have created the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications . . . which, 
in turn, would have established incompatible standards of conduct for the trus-
tee.”)). 
 37 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes (1966 
amendment). 
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class members.”38  The threshold requirements of Rule 23 are found 
in subdivision (a).39  In order for any class to be certified, the rule 
mandates that four necessary conditions be met: numerosity of plain-
tiffs so as to render joinder impracticable,40 commonality of questions 
of law or fact with respect to the entire class,41 typicality of class mem-
bers’ claims,42 and adequate class representation so as to protect ab-
sent class members’ interests.43  Once the conditions of Rule 23(a) 
have been fulfilled, a court may certify a class pursuant to one of 
three categories before progressing further into the settlement nego-
tiation and trial phases.44
As an essential part of determining whether a class should be 
certified under Rule 23(a), the court must carefully scrutinize the 
adequacy of the counsel who will represent the class.45  Because of the 
 38 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 34, ¶ 23.02 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 
42–43 (1940) (due process requires that interests of absent party be protected)). 
 39 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 40 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
 41 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
 42 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). 
 43 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 44 Rule 23(b) sets forth three categories of class actions which may be certified, 
conditioned upon the satisfaction of Rule 23(a).  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).  Rule 
23(b)(1) applies “if individual actions would create a risk of mandating that the de-
fendant engage in incompatible conduct, or would as a practical matter substantially 
impair the interests of other identically situated class members.”  Jon Romberg, Half 
a Loaf Is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of Particular Issues Under 
Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 259 (2002); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).  
Rule 23(b)(2) applies when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act 
on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final in-
junctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a  
whole . . . .”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).  Finally, Rule 23(b)(3) applies when “the court 
finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predomi-
nate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the con-
troversy.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also Romberg, supra, at 258–61 (discussing 
Rule 23 generally).  Subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) are somewhat extraneous to the 
focus of this Comment.   (Injunctive relief may come with a proposed issuance of 
coupons, making a proposed settlement more palatable; however, the focus here is 
on the substitution of coupons in place of cash.)  Because Rule 23(b)(3) centers 
around the award of money damages, it provides the ideal backdrop for analysis of 
settlements that include the substitution of coupon distributions instead of cash 
awards to absent class members.  Thus, in order to focus on post-certification issues 
(as opposed to various topics involved with whether an action should be certified at 
all), and for simplification, this Comment proceeds upon the presumptions that the 
class actions at issue: (1) have been certified by a federal district court, or would have 
been had they not been filed in state court; and (2) have been certified pursuant to 
Rule 23(b)(3) in a federal district court, or would have been had they not been filed 
in state court. 
 45 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 34, ¶ 23.01. 
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inherent ability of class counsel to effectively collude46 with the de-
fendants to arrange a settlement optimally suited to each other’s in-
terests at the expense of absent class members without a seat at the 
bargaining table, a judge should be careful to “ensure that the . . . 
class counsel will represent [the] class . . . fairly, adequately[,] and ef-
ficiently.”47
However, ensuring this is easier said than done.  Of particular 
relevance to the Coupon Settlement Problem is the perverse incen-
tive structure attorneys face in pursuing damages on behalf of absent 
class members.48 While class action attorneys have been beneficently 
labeled “private attorneys general” to describe their theoretical ability 
to ensure adequate statutory enforcement, they have simultaneously 
been criticized as “bounty hunters.”49  In a seminal attorney’s fees ar-
ticle, Professor John Coffee has argued that the economic incentives 
for attorneys generate the disparate impact that class action settle-
ments tend to have on absent class members.50  The structural reality 
that the lawyer “is unconstrained by the dictates or interests of a spe-
cific client” reinforces the disharmony between the incentives of ab-
sent class members and their representative in court.51  A number of 
the resulting effects of this practical inability of absent class members 
to influence the litigation highlight the economic incentive prob-
lem.52
First, because they have a larger economic stake in the litigation 
than any individual class member, attorneys become more risk averse 
than the absent class members they represent, increasing the likeli-
hood of accepting a substantively inadequate settlement.53 Moreover, 
this risk aversion entices class action attorneys to file a high volume of 
cases, thereby spreading risk and decreasing the time and effort the 
attorney is willing or able to devote to any one action.54  This also 
tends to result in inadequate relief to aggrieved class members.55
 46 See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem 
Prods., Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1050 (1995) (arguing that defendants “bought 
off class counsel and other plaintiffs’ lawyers”). 
 47 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 34, ¶ 23.01; see also infra notes 69–77 and accompa-
nying text. 
 48 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the 
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 236–61 (1983). 
 49 Id. at 218. 
 50 Id. at 284. 
 51 Id. at 229. 
 52 See id. at 230–35. 
 53 Id. at 230–32. 
 54 Coffee, supra note 48, at 230–32. 
 55 Id. 
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Second, counsel autonomy significantly increases the risk of col-
lusion between lawyer and defendant.56  For example, a self-
interested attorney would prefer a $500,000 settlement with a fee of 
$300,000 over a settlement of $1,000,000 with a fee of $200,000.57  
Knowing this, defendants are, of course, willing to exploit the attor-
ney’s self-interest by settling for a lesser total dollar amount with a 
higher percentage going to the class advocate.58  Coffee asserts that: 
The possibility of collusive settlements grows in direct proportion 
to the attorney’s “independence” from his client. The naked self 
interest of the bounty hunter lies in his fee, not the recovery to 
the class. As others have said many times, the parties can find a 
variety of means by which to trade a low settlement for a high at-
torney’s fee, once the client becomes only a distant bystander to 
the litigation. To say this is not to claim that plaintiffs’ attorneys 
systematically subordinate the class recovery to their own fee, but 
it is to say that the plaintiff’s attorney is subject to a serious con-
flict of interest—one that can distort the settlement process and 
reduce the deterrent effect of private litigation . . . .59
Third, the complete absence of a vested property right for attor-
neys who institute class action litigation creates a collective action 
problem.60  Other potential advocates for the class are easily attracted 
to free-ride on the instituting attorney’s diligence.61  As a result, that 
attorney has no incentive to expend the “same effort in search and 
discovery as [he] would if [he] could be assured of the ability to reap 
the full economic return” of filing a successful class action.62  Again, 
this leads to an increased tendency to accept a less than optimal rem-
edy for absent class members.63
The disparity between the motivations of absent class members 
and class counsel underlies the historic abuse of absent class mem-
bers.64  As the economic incentives of class action lawyers and their 
clients diverge, self-interest heavily influences settlement practices, 
resulting in a “nonzero-sum game” where adversaries (i.e., defendants 
and class counsel) can structure a solution to their respective bene-
 56 Id. at 232–33. 
 57 Id. at 243. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 232–33. 
 60 Coffee, supra note 48, at 233. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See infra Part II.B. 
DAY_FINAL 6/12/2008  11:49:56 AM 
2008] COMMENT 1095 
 
fit.65  Unfortunately, absent class members normally bear the brunt of 
this incentive structure.  Settlement practices “end[] not with the 
bang of victory or defeat, but only the whimper of dubious settle-
ments,” which quite often includes inadequate compensation for in-
jured class members.66  As Professor Susan Koniak asserts, class coun-
sel are “quite capable of talking themselves into believing that a deal 
promising them a sure and hefty fee also does right by the class, how-
ever much a disinterested observer in possession of all the facts would 
think the class had been seriously short-changed.”67 As this Comment 
argues, more aggressive steps must be taken to prevent these external 
motivations from driving the substantive remedy available to absent 
class members.68
Finally, of central importance to the issues discussed in this 
Comment is the background practice of judicial supervision over class 
action settlements.  As a practical matter, class action lawsuits rarely 
go to trial.69  While some are dismissed on legal motion, the vast ma-
jority are settled.70  Rule 23(e) mandates that before going into effect, 
agreed-upon settlements are subject to a fairness review hearing con-
ducted by the trial judge to ensure that the settlement proposal pro-
vides for “fair, reasonable, and adequate” relief for all parties to the 
action.71  In the 1966 revisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, the Advisory Committee gave little guidance on the application 
of Rule 23(e), merely “restat[ing] the rule’s instruction without 
elaboration: ‘Subdivision (e) requires approval of the court . . . for 
 65 Coffee, supra note 48, at 244–45. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Susan P. Koniak, How Like a Winter?  The Plight of Absent Class Members Denied 
Adequate Representation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1787, 1798 (2004). 
 68 See infra Parts IV.B, V.A. 
 69 Stephen Shapiro, Restrictions on Class Action Settlement Agreements, 12 IUS 
GENTIUM 175, 175–76 (2006). 
 70 Id. 
 71 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).  Rule 23(e) provides in pertinent part:  
[C]laims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled, volun-
tarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.  The 
following procedures apply to a proposed settlement, voluntary dis-
missal, or compromise: (1) The court must direct notice in a reason-
able manner to all class members who would be bound by a proposed 
settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise;  (2) If the proposal 
would bind class members, the court may approve it only after a hear-
ing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).  The remaining subparagraphs of Rule 23(e) are largely out-
side the scope of this Comment.  They deal mostly with disclosure of agreements re-
lating to the proposed settlements, exclusion opportunities for individual class 
members, and objections to the proposed settlement by individual class members.  
Id. 
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the dismissal or compromise of any class action.’”72  This lack of guid-
ance has translated into decades of judicial interpretation of “fair, 
reasonable, and adequate,”73 and forms the primary basis for this 
Comment—the context-specific interpretation of CAFA’s judicial 
scrutiny over proposed coupon settlements. 
A number of courts have attempted to explicate exactly what 
level of scrutiny a judge should maintain when reviewing a proposed 
settlement.74  Judge Posner writes that Rule 23(e) 
requires district judges to exercise the highest degree of vigilance 
in scrutinizing proposed settlements of class actions.  We and 
other courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the 
settlement phase of a class action suit a fiduciary of the class, who 
is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires 
of fiduciaries.75
Notwithstanding this theoretically strong judicial review directive, 
significant concerns exist regarding improper qualification of pro-
posed settlements.76  One critic argues that “judicial review of a pro-
posed . . . settlement provides insufficient protection to the class . . . .  
[J]udges approve . . . settlements even while admitting that the set-
tlement[s] . . . ‘do not provide plaintiffs substantial monetary  
relief.’”77
 72 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (citing FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23(e) advisory committee’s note). 
 73 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Benefit Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002); 
Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Cendant Corp. 
Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001);  Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 
67 F.3d 1072, 1079 (2d Cir. 1995); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 823 F.2d 20, 22–
23 (2d Cir. 1987).  Part IV, infra, relates applications of Rule 23(e)’s standard of re-
view to the coupon settlement context and argues that the rule provides substandard 
assurance of relief for class members. 
 74 See, e.g., Culver, 277 F.3d at 915 (fiduciary duty of district judge to class is non-
delegable); Grant, 823 F.2d at 22 (citing In re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig., 798 F.2d 
35, 37 (2d Cir. 1986)) (“In approving a proposed class action settlement, the district 
court has a fiduciary responsibility to ensure that the settlement is fair and not a 
product of collusion, and that the class members’ interests were represented ade-
quately.”) (internal quotations omitted); Stewart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 756 F.2d 
1285, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985) (judge has fiduciary duty to class and motions to substi-
tute counsel must be closely scrutinized). 
 75 Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 279–80. 
 76 See Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Anti-
trust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1070 (2002).  Profes-
sor Leslie’s argument, while specific to the coupon settlement context, id., can be 
logically extrapolated to reveal a larger problem with the current state of judicial re-
view over class action settlements. 
 77 Id.  
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Other scholars support this contention.78  One commentator as-
serts that “[p]rocedural rules, such as the requirements for notice 
and judicial approval of settlements, provide only a weak bulwark 
against self-dealing and collusion.”79  Another maintains that “[t]he 
trial court’s approval is a weak reed on which to rely once the adver-
saries have linked arms and approached the court in a solid phalanx 
seeking its approval.”80
The mechanics of settlement and review also play a considerable 
role in improper approval of bad settlements under Rule 23(e).  Pro-
fessor Koniak claims that because only defendants and counsel for 
the plaintiff class are seated at the bargaining table, the judge is not 
privy to the give and take of settlement negotiation, and is 
thus at a distinct disadvantage . . . .  [The judge] has no reliable 
way to discern in which nook or cranny . . . evidence of collusion 
may lie.  She may not even know what she should be looking  
for . . . .  By and large she knows just what she is told.  And the 
telling is not done by adversaries presenting clashing views on the 
settlement’s fairness or the adequacy of the representation pro-
vided [but by both class counsel and defendant, who are in ex-
plicit agreement] . . . .  So all most judges hear is a one-sided 
presentation about how wonderful the settlement is and how ag-
gressively class counsel championed the absent class’s cause. . . .  
Judges, honest as they may be and diligently as most may work, 
have an interest in settling any and all cases, and an even bigger 
interest in seeing large and cumbersome class actions settle.81
Indeed, even Judge Friendly, the renowned Second Circuit jurist, ac-
knowledged that once the central players in a class action have 
agreed on a settlement, “[a]ll the dynamics conduce to judicial ap-
proval of such settlements.”82
The background issues discussed in this section frame the Cou-
pon Settlement Problem.  Specifically, the class action mechanism 
 78 See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC 
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 27, 488, 545 (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Cham-
pion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 70 
(1985) (reiterating argument that stricter judicial review should be implemented 
over nonpecuniary settlements in securities class actions). 
 79 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 78, at 120. 
 80 Coffee, supra note 78, at 26–27. 
 81 Koniak, supra note 67, at 1797–98 (internal citations omitted).  The reality that 
a reviewing judge is at a disadvantage in smoking out inequitable coupon settlements 
provides a strong justification for a presumption against all coupon settlements.  See 
infra Part V.A. 
 82 Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissent-
ing). 
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can and should be used to resolve large-scale litigation concerns that 
otherwise could not be addressed through individual actions.83  The 
baseline incentives, however, for the attorney representing the class 
are inherently out of line with those of the absentee litigants.84  This 
influences proposed settlements that can award starkly dispropor-
tionate relief to the attorney over absent class members.  Additionally, 
the ambiguity of Rule 23(e) and the actual procedures of settlement 
negotiation hinder the reviewing judge’s ability to identify collusive 
inequities contained in the proposed settlement.85  This results in the 
fundamental flaw addressed in this Comment—the improper ratifica-
tion of unfair coupon settlements. 
B. The Coupon Settlement Problem 
When used correctly, class actions can effectively kill three birds 
with one procedural stone: they can serve to efficiently compensate a 
vast number of plaintiffs who otherwise would not have been able to 
litigate legitimate claims due to prohibitive economies of scale; they 
allow defendants to rest easy with the knowledge that any and all 
claims against them will be resolved in one action; and they relieve 
courts of the “flood of duplicative claims.”86  However, as sophisti-
cated defendants and class counsel gained experience in class action 
litigation, the laudable goals of Rule 23 seemed to be lost amongst 
the widespread public scorn for class actions.87
One such abuse, repeatedly decried as the class action equiva-
lent to squeegee boys splashing water on a clean windshield expect-
ing to get paid for a problem they created,88 is the coupon settlement.  
In such an agreement, defendants agree to compensate class mem-
bers solely through the provision of coupons, or other promises for 
discounts on future purchases of the company’s products or ser-
vices.89  Historically, very few of these coupons are redeemed, and, as 
discussed below, those that are redeemed are often of less actual 
 83 See supra notes 31–47 and accompanying text. 
 84 See supra notes 48–68 and accompanying text. 
 85 See supra notes 69–82 and accompanying text. 
 86 Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1343. 
 87 See, e.g., Darryl Haralson & Adrienne Lewis, USA Today Snapshots: Opinions on 
Class-Action Lawsuits, USA TODAY, Mar. 24, 2003, at 1B. 
 88 See FTC Workshop, supra note 13, at 1176; Jason Hoppin, Florida Judge Compares 
Milberg to Squeegee Boy, RECORDER, Apr. 16, 2002, at 1.
 89 Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1344. 
DAY_FINAL 6/12/2008  11:49:56 AM 
2008] COMMENT 1099 
 
value than the ostensible face value of the coupon.90  Class counsel, in 
contrast, receive attorney’s fees in the form of large sums of cash, his-
torically based on a significant percentage of the aggregate face value 
of the coupons offered to the class.91  The overriding fear of these set-
tlements is that the three central players in the class action drama 
come out ahead: the court clears its docket; defendants receive global 
peace at relatively little cost (including the potential to induce future 
transactions that are profitable, even discounted by the coupon); and 
class counsel is handsomely compensated.  Absent class members—
those whose rights are waived, and who receive only a coupon in 
compensation—are very often left out in the cold.92
Coupon settlements are not inherently problematic.93 When 
structured even-handedly, they benefit plaintiffs by providing redress 
from injury, present defendants with an incentive to correct their al-
legedly wrongful or tortious behavior, as well as provide global peace 
to the claims alleged against them by allowing avoidance of duplica-
tive litigation.94  Furthermore, they are often necessary—“a defendant 
might be driven into bankruptcy if substantial cash damages are 
awarded, while coupons can provide class members with at least some 
benefit.”95  However, as coupon settlements became more prevalent, 
they revealed a serious defect: class counsel and defendants began 
collusively structuring settlements that benefited each other, to the 
detriment of absent class members.96  Counsel and defendants were 
able to use coupon settlements as a smoke screen to justify disposing 
of the litigation to each other’s substantive advantage.97  By structur-
ing damages in the form of a theoretically high-value aggregate cou-
pon offering to the plaintiff class, attorneys were able to take home 
 90 Id. at 1344, 1346–49 (discussing low coupon realization percentages and the 
comparatively low value of actual coupon relief in relation to the face value of the 
coupon). 
 91 Id. at 1344; see also Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 11. 
 92 See Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1343. 
 93 James Tharin & Brian Blockovich, Coupons and the Class Action Fairness Act, 18 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1443, 1445 (2006). 
 94 Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1344. 
 95 Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 
TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1614 (2006). 
 96 See FTC Workshop, supra note 13, at 1167.  Unlike private litigation, class ac-
tion litigation, particularly in the coupon settlement context, features settlements 
that “run a significant risk of collusion between opposing counsel.”  Id. 
 97 See id. at 1168 (discussing the various structures of coupon settlements that de-
fendants tend to employ); see also Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1344 (stating 
that lawyers in the coupon settlement context normally “receive cash fees in amounts 
that generally dwarf the award recovered by individual plaintiffs”); supra notes 48–68 
and accompanying text. 
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sizable fees, and defendants were able to get away with paying much 
less than they would have if the settlement had called for a cash 
award.98
Today, few proposed coupon settlements successfully and sub-
stantially benefit absent class members.99  In the classic unfairly struc-
tured coupon settlement, class attorneys inflate the apparent value of 
the coupon offering so as to receive a fee that dwarfs the award re-
covered by individual plaintiffs.100  In return, the defendants imple-
ment usage restrictions, limiting the ability and desire of absent class 
members to redeem their coupon compensation.101  Implementation 
of these usage restrictions takes a variety of forms: imposing adminis-
trative hurdles to the acquisition of the coupons; restricting the 
products or services to which the coupons may be applied; limiting 
the transferability of the coupons; enforcing a prohibitive expiration 
date; enforcing “blackout” dates on which the coupons are non-
usable; and imposing limits on the aggregation of coupons.102  By re-
stricting the practical ability or desire of class members to redeem the 
coupons, the actual value of the coupon offering is normally worth 
far less than advertised.103
In this archetypical example, the class counsel obviously benefits 
from exorbitant fees generated by an inflated settlement value.104  As 
a complement benefit, defendants realize value added from the set-
tlement when they are able to buy off—cheaply—any future suits, 
given the preclusive effect of the class action settlement, and are able 
to pay very little in the way of actual damages (when coupons go un-
redeemed).105  Defendants also benefit when class members are in-
 98 See Sherman, supra note 95, at 1614. 
 99 Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 93, at 1449. 
 100 Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1344. 
 101 Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Hermann, The Class Action Fairness Act: An Ill-
Conceived Approach to Class Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1695, 1699–1700 (2006). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 11. 
 104 Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 93, at 1446. 
 105 FTC Workshop, supra note 13, at 1167–68.  At the FTC Workshop, Professor 
Christopher Leslie detailed four possible outcomes that accrue to defendants when 
individual class members act with respect to their coupon payment.  First, an indi-
vidual “class member might not use the settlement coupon at all.” Id. at 1167.  Sec-
ond, the class member “could use the coupon because the settlement coupon in-
duced her to make a purchase that she otherwise would not have made.”  Id. at  
1167–68.  Third, the “class member could use her coupon for a purchase that she 
was planning to make anyway.”  Id. at 1168.  Finally, the “class member could transfer 
the settlement coupon to a third party who uses it.”  Id.  Because defendants benefit 
when the first two options occur—under the first outcome, the defendant pays noth-
ing; under the second outcome, the defendant earns revenue that it otherwise would 
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duced to purchase a product or service that they otherwise would not 
have purchased (so they can avoid the feeling of getting nothing 
from the settlement).106  Absent class members, however, are rele-
gated to the receipt of a coupon which very often provides little or no 
value.107  Compounding this problem is the reality that neither class 
attorneys, who benefit (notwithstanding their fiduciary duty to the 
class) from maximizing their fees, nor defendants, who obviously pre-
fer to minimize the amount they must pay under the settlement, have 
an incentive to put the interests of allegedly harmed plaintiffs before 
their own.108
This “horror story”109 is more than a theoretical nightmare.  In 
an oft-cited Seventh Circuit decision,110 the plaintiffs alleged that the 
Bank of Boston had over-collected escrow monies from homeowners 
and profited from the interest.111  The settlement, which had been 
approved by an Alabama judge, awarded up to $8.76 in account cred-
its to individual class members.112  The plaintiffs’ lawyers received 
more than $8.5 million in fees, which were debited directly from in-
dividual class members’ escrow accounts,113 resulting in a net loss to 
many or all of the class members.114
In its report supporting the passage of CAFA, the Senate Judici-
ary Committee catalogued specific examples of the Settlement Cou-
pon Problem in practice.115  A few cases the Committee noted are 
summarized below. 
not have earned—they have additional incentive to structure coupon settlements to 
reach these outcomes.  Id. at 1167–68. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 1163 (describing how coupon settlements often provide consumers with 
no meaningful relief). 
 108 Id. at 1169–70 (explaining that evidence suggests that procedural safeguards 
designed to inhibit self-interested settlements between class counsel and defendants 
are insufficient). 
 109 Shapiro, supra note 69, at 191–92. 
 110 Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston, 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 111 Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Leah Lorber, Federal Courts Should Decide 
Interstate Class Actions: A Call for Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 494 (2000). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See id. (detailing one class member whose escrow account was debited $144.25 
as a miscellaneous disbursement which paid for the attorney’s fees agreed upon in 
the settlement); see also Beisner, Shors & Miller, supra note 27, at 1446 (relating the 
story of another class member whose account was debited eighty dollars toward the 
payment of the class counsel fee). 
 115 S. REP. NO. 108-123, at 16–18 (2003); see also Beisner, Shors & Miller, supra 
note 27, at 1447 (summarizing the various cases that the Senate Judiciary Committee 
flagged due to inequitable coupon settlement proposals). 
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In Ramsey v. Nestle Waters North America, Inc.,116 a prime example 
of a so-called “squeegee boy” case,117 plaintiffs alleged that Poland 
Springs water actually did not come from a deep spring in the woods 
of Maine, as the company had advertised.  The proposed settlement 
provided discounts on Poland Springs water to class plaintiffs, while 
the attorneys pocketed $1.35 million.  In other words, the absent class 
members received discounts on the very product they alleged caused 
them harm.118
In re Kansas Microsoft Litigation119 is an excellent example of re-
strictive coupon provisions that devalue a proposed settlement.  Mi-
crosoft settled ten state antitrust class actions in which the software 
giant allegedly used its monopolistic powers to unfairly increase 
prices.  The settlement called for the distribution of a five- to ten-
dollar coupon, good for a discount on future purchases of particular 
computer software or hardware.120  To realize the value of the settle-
ment, class members had to download a special redemption form on 
Microsoft’s website, fill it out, and mail it in.  Furthermore, to redeem 
the coupon, the class member was required to re-mail the voucher, 
along with a photocopy of an original receipt and an original UPC 
Code.121  Finally, the vouchers were good only for particular Microsoft 
products.122  In addition to the disproportionate relationship between 
the excessive attorney’s fees and the sharply limited dollar value of 
individual coupons, the complexity and trouble of actually using the 
coupon corrupts the settlement’s validity.”123  Moreover, class attor-
neys sought hundreds of millions of dollars in fees (actual recovery 
was undisclosed).124 For the class members, the difficulty in realizing 
any actual value is likely to dissuade many of those who might other-
wise use the coupon, and would in any event lessen the real value of 
the coupon to the small subset of class members who did use it.125
In DeGradi v. KB Holdings, Inc.,126 the plaintiffs asserted that KB 
Toys engaged in deceptive pricing practices on certain products.  
 116 No. 03 CHK 817 (Ill. Cir. Ct.. Nov. 5, 2003). 
 117 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 118 Edward D. Murphy et al., Conflict and Change, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 4, 
2004, at 1F. 
 119 No. 99 CV 17089 (Kan. Dist. Ct.  July 29, 2003). 
 120 Beisner, Shors & Miller, supra note 27, at 1448. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 See In re Kansas Microsoft Litigation¸ No. 99 CV 17089. 
 124 Id. 
 125 See id. 
 126 No. 02 CH 15838 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 1, 2003). 
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Under the settlement agreement, the toy retailer agreed to reduce 
certain products by thirty percent over a six-day period.  Put more 
simply, the defendant “held a sale.”127  The attorneys received about 
one million dollars.128
In Chavez v. GameStop Corp.,129 a class of plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendant video game distributor was not selling new video games as 
advertised but was selling previously purchased games that had been 
returned.  Under the settlement, any plaintiff who could produce a 
receipt would receive a coupon for five percent off the price of any 
one game.  Thus, plaintiffs could purchase a new game for $1.25 less 
than the $25 purchase price, but only if they kept their receipts.  
They could not redeem the coupon over Gamestop’s website, but had 
to redeem it at a retail store.130  Class counsel received $125,000.131
In Ross v. Portillo’s Restaurant Group Inc.,132 aggrieved consumers 
filed a complaint that a Chicago restaurant chain had fraudulently 
misrepresented their beer steins’ volume to be twelve ounces, when 
in fact the containers held only 10.6 ounces.  The settlement called 
for plaintiffs to receive coupons good for one dollar off every subse-
quent five-dollar purchase at any restaurant in the chain.133   
In Shields v. Bridgestone/Firestone Inc.,134 the class plaintiffs were 
owners of Firestone tires that had been recalled by the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration for various defects, yet had 
caused no injury or property damage.  Under a settlement ratified by 
a Texas court, Firestone agreed to redesign certain tires, which it had 
already planned to do irrespective of the lawsuit, and to develop a 
 127 Beisner, Shors & Miller, supra note 27, at 1449. 
 128 Stephanie Zimmermann, KB Toys Settles Lawsuit over “Low” Prices by Offering Dis-
count, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Oct. 11, 2003, at 3. 
 129 No. CGC-02-406658 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 2003). 
 130 As with the problem with the proposed coupon settlement in In re Kansas Mi-
crosoft Litigation, No. 99 CV 17089 (Kan. Dist. Ct. July 29, 2003), the proposed settle-
ment in this case offers not only very little in terms of dollars and cents, but also 
makes it logistically difficult to actually derive any value from the coupons even if one 
wanted to do so.  See supra notes 119–25  and accompanying text. 
 131 Gamestop.com, Notice of Class Action and Proposed Settlement (Aug. 1, 
2003), available at http://www.gamestop.com/gs/help/classaction.asp. 
 132 No. 00 CH 13612 (Ill. Cir. Nov. 18, 2003). 
 133 Judge Approves Portillo's Class Action Settlement over Mislabeled Beer, PR NEWSWIRE, 
Nov. 26, 2003.  The problem with this settlement is emblematic of the general Cou-
pon Settlement Problem—while class members do receive a discount on future pur-
chases of ale, the settlement forces injured customers to expend an additional four 
dollars to receive one dollar in recovery, increasing the defendants’ revenue stream 
more than it might have had the settlement never been accepted.  See id. 
 134 No. E-0167637 (Tex. Dist. Ct. July 31, 2002). 
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consumer education and awareness campaign.  Class members re-
ceived nothing.  The lawyers received nineteen million dollars.135
Several other amusing yet disconcerting cases have contributed 
to the public perception that the American class action system pro-
motes sham resolutions.136  For instance, General Mills settled a class 
action lawsuit over improper pesticides that had come into contact 
with the oats used to make Cheerios.137  Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowl-
edged that no physical harm had actually been caused to any class 
member.138  Class members pocketed a coupon good for a free box of 
Cheerios.  The settlement garnered the attorneys almost two million 
dollars.139
In an action against a company that was alleged to be producing 
unsafe baby cribs, class members received either a crib repair kit or a 
coupon for fifty-five dollars, which could be used toward the future 
purchase of any of the defendant’s products.140  Of course, the cou-
pon offering was valuable only for consumers who planned to have 
another baby and still trusted the very company that produced the 
faulty cribs.141
Finally, in what could be the most jaw-dropping coupon settle-
ment to date, Acushnet, a Chicago company, during a promotion in 
which it was giving away golf gloves, exhausted its free inventory and 
began handing out free sleeves of golf balls instead.  On behalf of all 
“injured” recipients of free golf balls, attorneys filed suit against 
Acushnet for its “transgressions,” and the defendant and class counsel 
began settlement negotiations.  The resulting settlement, certified by 
 135 See Miles Moore, BFS Settles Nationwide Class Action Suit, RUBBER & PLASTICS 
NEWS, Aug. 4, 2003. 
 136 See, e.g., Andrew S. Weinstein, Note, Avoiding the Race to Res Judicata: Federal An-
tisuit Injunctions of Competing State Class Actions, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1085, 1085 (2000). 
 137 See Ameet Sachdev, Coupon Awards Reward Whom? Class-Action Settlements that Pay 
Lawyers Millions of Dollars and Give Plaintiffs Coupons that are Sometimes Useless are Draw-
ing Ire in Congress and Some Courts, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 29, 2004, at C1; David Zizzo, Law-
suit Can Mean Big Bucks for Tiny Tort, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 17, 1995, at 1. 
 138 Sachdev, supra note 137, at 1. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Dorel Juvenile Group Settles Class Action Lawsuits, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 6, 2003, Lex-
isNexis Library, PR Newswire File. 
 141 Id.; see also U.S. Chamber Inst. For Legal Reform, State Court Class Action Settle-
ments: A Pattern of Abuse and a Proposed Solution, at 4, available at http://www.ftc.gov 
/bcp/workshops/classaction/other/inst_legalreform.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) 
[hereinafter A Pattern of Abuse]. 
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an Illinois judge, granted aggrieved class members another free 
sleeve of golf balls.142  Class counsel  took home $100,000 in fees.143
In response to the award of wholly inequitable relief to absent 
class members with legitimate (or at least colorable) claims, Congress 
passed CAFA to restore the notion of fundamental fairness to the 
American class action system.  Moreover, the goal was to rid class ac-
tions of attorney-created cash cows144 that provided little to no benefit 
for plaintiffs that were not actually injured, did not care about de 
minimis relief, or simply did not know that a class action lawsuit had 
been filed on their behalf. 
III. THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 
The genesis of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 dates as far 
back as the late 1990s.  The Act was created in response to exponen-
tial growth in the number of class actions,145 as well as a wave of criti-
cism of the American class action system permeating the country.146  
The bill originally contained only expansions of federal court juris-
diction,147 but Congress later amended it by adding a wider array of 
reforms that included the Act’s settlement provisions.148  President 
Bush signed the bill into law on February 18, 2005,149 amid a spectacle 
of legislators, media, advocacy groups, contributors to the bill, and 
invited guests that had been affected by manipulation of the class ac-
 142 Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1358; see also Martha Johanek, Caddies or 
Cads? Class-Action Lawyers Find the Green in Errant Golf Balls, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort 
Lauderdale, Fla.), Sept. 13, 1999, at 21A. 
 143 Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1358. 
 144 Beisner, Shors & Miller, supra note 27, at 1450. 
 145 John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case of It . . . 
in State Court, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 157 (2001) (summarizing studies that 
show that the number of class actions tripled during the 1990s). 
 146 See, e.g., Editorial, Actions Without Class, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2001, at A14 (ob-
serving that “no portion of the American civil justice system [was in] more of a mess 
than the world of class actions”); Editorial, Class-Action Plaintiffs Deserve More Than 
Coupons, USA TODAY, Oct. 9, 2002, at 12A; Editorial, Class Action Showdown, WALL ST. 
J., July 8, 2004, at A14; Editorial, Reforming Class Actions, WASH. POST, June 15, 2003, at 
B6. 
 147 H.R. 3789, 105th Cong. (1998). 
 148 See, e.g., S. 2062, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 274, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1115, 
108th Cong. (2003); S. 1712, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 353, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 
1875, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 2083, 105th Cong. (1998).  The bill that was finally 
signed into law was S. 5, 109th Cong. (2005).  The main sponsor of the bill was Sena-
tor Charles Grassley.  See id. 
 149 Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, President Signs Class-
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (Feb. 18, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2005/02/20050218-11.html. 
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tion system.150  Citing the need for class action reform, President 
Bush stated that the law 
helps ensure justice by making two essential reforms.  First, it 
moves most large, interstate class-actions into federal courts. . . .  
Second, the bill provides new safeguards to ensure that plaintiffs 
and class-action lawsuits are treated fairly.  The bill requires 
judges to consider the real monetary value of coupons and dis-
counts, so that victims can count on true compensation for their 
injuries.151
The two relevant segments of the Class Action Fairness Act that 
are pertinent to this Comment are summarized below: the expansion 
of federal court jurisdiction over multi-state class actions, and, of par-
ticular relevance here, the provision attempting to curb coupon set-
tlement abuses. 
A. Expansion of Federal Court Jurisdiction 
To resolve perceived abusive class action forum shopping,152 
Congress enacted CAFA in part153 to greatly expand the jurisdictional 
powers of the federal courts over class actions involving parties who 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id.  President Bush went on to say that the legislation shows “progress” in the 
class action arena, and that “there’s more [work] to do.”  Id.  Given the arguments 
advanced in Part IV, infra, along with President Bush’s qualifying statements about 
the effectiveness of the legislation he signed, one can plausibly argue that even at the 
time of enactment, the actual substantive effectiveness of CAFA was in doubt. 
 152 Whatever the merit behind the argument that class action lawyers abused the 
class action system by filing interstate class action complaints in so-called “magic ju-
risdictions,” see Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1346, that debate far exceeds the 
scope of this Comment and will be left for another day.  CAFA’s jurisdictional expan-
sions are relevant here only insofar as the Act’s potential to dramatically increase the 
number of coupon settlements proposed in federal court.  See supra note 26 and ac-
companying text.  For commentary on class action forum shopping, see Medical 
Monitoring and Asbestos Litigation—A Discussion with Richard Scruggs and Victor Schwartz, 
MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. ASBESTOS, Mar. 1, 2002, at 19. 
 153 The Senate Report of CAFA’s passage sheds further light on the motivation of 
the sponsors of the bill: “[B]ecause interstate class actions typically involve more 
people, more money, and more interstate commerce ramifications than any other 
type of lawsuit, the Committee firmly believes that such cases properly belong in fed-
eral court.”  S. REP. No. 109-14 (2005).  Along these same lines, a major goal of the 
bill was to keep American federalism intact.  Specifically, a recurring problem with 
multistate class actions was the preclusive effect a judgment in one state had on class 
members who filed their own action in a different state. Id.  In other words, states 
bound parties from other states to a decision based upon their own view of the law.  
Congress believed the federal courts were best equipped to balance concerns of effi-
cient multi-jurisdiction litigation and individual due process.  Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005). 
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are citizens of different states.154  Under the Act, federal district courts 
have original jurisdiction over any civil action in which the aggregate 
amount in controversy is greater than $5 million,155 and is a class ac-
tion156 in which any plaintiff class member is a citizen of a state or for-
eign nation different from any defendant.157  This amended the con-
ventional rule by allowing for minimal diversity,158 whereas before 
CAFA all named class representatives must have had distinct citizen-
ship from all defendants.159  Furthermore, CAFA relaxes the amount 
in controversy requirement;160 the traditional rule161 required each 
class member to meet the specified amount in controversy.162  While 
the changes are expansive, the Act limits federal jurisdiction to class 
actions where the aggregate number of plaintiff class members 
amounts to at least one hundred.163  CAFA also provides for a number 
of exceptions to the Act’s jurisdictional expansion.164
Another major jurisdictional provision in CAFA is the enhance-
ment of defendants’ removal powers when a class action is filed in 
state court.165  Conventional removal procedures permit only out-of-
state defendants to remove a case to federal court.166  Furthermore, 
prior to the passage of CAFA, where the class action was filed against 
 154 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §§ 4–5, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(d), 1453 (West 
2007).  The Act makes no changes to federal question class actions.  Rubenstein, su-
pra note 13, at 4. 
 155 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2). 
 156 The Act defines a class action as “any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure au-
thorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class ac-
tion.”  Id. § 1332(d)(1(B). 
 157 Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A). 
 158 Id. 
 159 Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 5. 
 160 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(6). 
 161 See Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294–95 (1973) superseded by statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1367 (2006).  Section 1367 permits absent class members’ claims to be 
joined via supplemental jurisdiction so long as at least one named plaintiff meets the 
amount in controversy.  See Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 4. 
 162 Currently, the amount in controversy required for diversity jurisdiction is set at 
$75,000.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2006). 
 163 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(5)(B). 
 164 Id. § 1332 (d)(4)–(5).  These exceptions include: (1) compulsory and permis-
sive local controversy exceptions for truly intra-state disputes, (2) a “Delaware carve-
out” designed to keep corporate cases in Delaware chancery courts, and (3) a civil 
rights exception, allowing states to keep sovereign immunity defenses available for 
state actors.  Id. 
 165 28 U.S.C. § 1453. 
 166 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). 
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multiple defendants, universal consent to removal was required.167 
Also, defendants were statutorily barred from removing to federal 
court after one year of the commencement of the action.168  Finally, 
decisions by the district court to remand to state court were not re-
viewable.169
Under CAFA, these restrictions are relaxed: any defendant, in-
cluding in-state defendants, may remove to federal court,170 provided 
the action fits CAFA’s jurisdictional requirement; concurrence of 
other defendants is unnecessary for a defendant to unilaterally re-
move the case to federal court;171 the one year removal time limit is 
erased;172 and finally, district court decisions to remand to state court 
are reviewable within seven days.173
Congress took a bold step by enacting sweeping reforms to fed-
eral court jurisdiction with regard to class actions.  Commentators 
generally agree that these changes give defendants a new procedural 
weapon to defend collective actions asserted against them.174  How-
ever broad the general scope of CAFA’s jurisdiction provisions are, it 
appears self-evident that the expansion of federal court jurisdiction 
over multistate class action litigation engenders manifestation of the 
Coupon Settlement Problem, more than ever before, in federal 
court.  As discussed in Part III, the already burdened dockets of fed-
eral district judges will be weighed down, increasing the likelihood of 
inadequate supervision of coupon settlements, and thereby diminish-
ing the probability that absent class members will be sufficiently com-
pensated for their alleged injuries. 
 167 See, e.g., Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 533–34 n.3 
(6th Cir. 1999) (“[I]n order for a notice of removal to be properly before the court, 
all defendants who have been served or otherwise properly joined in the action must 
either join in the removal, or file a written consent to the removal.”). 
 168 28 U.S.C § 1446(b). 
 169 Id. § 1447(d). 
 170 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(b)(2007). 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. § 1453(c)(1). 
 174 See, e.g., Beisner, Shors & Miller, supra note 27, at 1444; C. Douglas Floyd, The 
Inadequacy of the Interstate Commerce Justification for the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 
55 EMORY L.J. 487, 491–93 (2006) (CAFA significantly expands the scope of original 
and removal jurisdiction); Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 15 (“Those defending state 
court class actions definitely have a new weapon in their arsenal in the ability to re-
move [class actions] to federal court.”); Sherman, supra note 95, at 1615 (“CAFA is 
the most significant change in class action practice since the 1966  amendment of 
Rule 23 . . . .”); Id. at 1608 (“After CAFA, the federal courts are essentially ‘the only 
game in town’ for multistate and national class actions.”). 
DAY_FINAL 6/12/2008  11:49:56 AM 
2008] COMMENT 1109 
 
B. CAFA’s Coupon Settlement Provisions 
For all of the excessive abuses surrounding class actions and 
coupon settlements,175 the Class Action Consumers Bill of Rights (the 
major provision of the Class Action Fairness Act designed to inhibit 
these and other exploitations) is surprisingly straightforward and 
sharply limited in scope.176  The “heart”177 of the Bill of Rights ad-
dresses attorney’s fees in the coupon settlement context.178  Other set-
tlement process-related provisions of CAFA’s Bill of Rights prohibit 
settlements that result in a net financial loss to individual class mem-
bers, absent a “written finding that non-monetary benefits to the class 
member substantially outweigh the monetary loss”;179 ban all settle-
ments that disproportionately reward in-state class members com-
pared to out-of-state class members;180 and require notification to 
“appropriate” government officials of any proposed class action set-
tlement.181
The attorney’s fees provisions, however, are the backbone of the 
Bill of Rights.  CAFA mandates that if a proposed settlement calls for 
a “recovery of coupons to a class member, the portion of any attor-
ney’s fee award to class counsel that is attributable to the award of the 
coupons shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons 
that are redeemed.”182  In other words, prior to CAFA, if the coupon set-
tlement called for the defendant to distribute $500 million worth of 
coupons to class members, class counsel could pocket a percentage of 
this amount (for example, 20%, or $100 million).  However, given 
that the settlement was likely to be structured to limit individual class 
member’s ability or desire183 to redeem the coupon, the actual value 
of the settlement would likely be far less than $500 million (perhaps 
even less than what class counsel charged for its fee, a particularly 
odd and inequitable result). 
 175 See supra Part II.B. 
 176 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 3(a), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1711–1715 (West 
2007). 
 177 Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 10. 
 178 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1711–1715. 
 179 Id. § 1713.  This section responded to Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston, 92 F.3d 506 
(7th Cir. 1996).  See supra note 110 and accompanying text; see also Rubenstein, supra 
note 13, at 12. 
 180 Id. § 1714; see also Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 12. 
 181 Id. § 1715; see also Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 13.  These provisions all seem 
reasonable, laudable, and efficacious.  As such, this Comment does not argue that 
these provisions are ineffective in any way. 
 182 Id. § 1712(a) (emphasis added). 
 183 See supra Part II.B. 
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After CAFA, counsel may only receive a fee award in a coupon 
case based on the value of coupons that class members actually re-
deem.184  In the above hypothetical, for example, if only $100 million 
worth of coupons are redeemed, counsel will earn only $20 million 
(20% of $100 million), instead of $100 million (20% of $500 mil-
lion).185  Furthermore, as a necessary consequence of this provision, 
counsel must wait until it is reasonably evident that all who will re-
deem the coupons have done so already.186  This waiting period guar-
antees that counsel does not run off with the fee before the class 
members have had a chance to claim their award.187
If attorney’s fees are not calculated based on the coupon re-
demption percentage, CAFA requires that they be calculated based 
on the amount of time class counsel reasonably expended working 
on the action,188 and such fees must be approved by the court.189  If 
there is a mix of coupons and equitable relief, including injunctive 
remedies, “that portion of the attorney’s fee to be paid to class coun-
sel that is based upon a portion of the recovery of the coupons shall 
be calculated in accordance with subsection (a),”190 and “that portion 
of the attorney’s fee to be paid to class counsel that is not based upon 
a portion of the recovery of the coupons shall be calculated in accor-
dance with subsection (b).”191  In other words, counsel and defen-
dants may structure a settlement in which there is a mix of legal and 
equitable relief, but the attorney’s fees must accurately reflect the ac-
tual award absent class members receive.192  CAFA also allows, but 
does not require, a district court to “receive expert testimony from a 
 184 This method of fee calculation will be occasionally referred to in this Com-
ment as the “percentage method.” 
 185 See Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 11. 
 186 Shapiro, supra note 69, at 184. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §3(a), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(b)(1) (West 2007). 
 189 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(b)(2).  This subsection goes on to state that nothing shall 
be construed to prohibit application of a lodestar with a multiplier method of de-
termining attorney’s fees.  Id.  The lodestar with a multiplier is a method of calculat-
ing attorney’s fees by “multiplying a reasonable number of hours worked by the pre-
vailing hourly rate in the community for similar work, and often considering such 
additional factors as the degree of skill and difficulty involved in the case, the degree 
of its urgency, its novelty, and the like.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 960 (8th ed. 1999). 
The multiplier has the potential to significantly increase the attorney’s fee over a 
straight lodestar.  Stanley M. Grossman, Statutory Fee Shifting in Civil Rights Class Ac-
tions: Incentive or Liability?, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 587, 591 (1997). 
 190 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(c)(1). 
 191 Id. § 1712(c)(2). 
 192 Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 11. 
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witness qualified to provide information on the actual value to the 
class members of the coupons that are redeemed.”193
The rationale for the foregoing provisions is simple—by limiting 
the attorney’s fees to an amount that actually reflects the true value of 
the aggregate award, attorneys will be induced to ensure that the sub-
stantive value accruing to class members is high, thereby justifying a 
high return for the attorney.194  The framers of the Act believed this 
to be preferable to a fee structure based on a theoretical coupon of-
fering that is not indicative of how much benefit actually accrues to 
class members.195  Put another way, the Act attempts to force plain-
tiffs’ attorneys to “share in the success,”196 or lack thereof, of the of-
fered coupon settlement.  Ideally, the attorney’s fees provisions will 
induce class attorneys to “focus sharply and intently up-front on mak-
ing the coupons redeemable, and therefore valuable.”197  Whether 
this is actually a realistic notion is yet to be seen.198
Finally, CAFA permits the effectuation of a settlement only when 
the district judge has certified, via written finding after a fairness 
hearing, that where the proposed settlement calls for class members 
to receive coupons, the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate 
for class members.”199  This subsection further grants the district 
court the discretion to require that the settlement provide for the dis-
tribution of a portion of the value of unclaimed coupons to charity or 
to the government,200 and that any such distributions are not to be 
used in the calculation of counsel fees.201
In its report upon passage of the Act, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee stated that when courts determine whether a proposed cou-
pon settlement is “fair, reasonable and adequate,” district judges 
should look to “the real monetary value and the likely utilization rate 
of the coupons provided by the settlement.”202  The text of the sub-
section, however, gives no guidance on what “fair, reasonable, and 
 193 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(d). 
 194 S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 30 (2005) (Conf. Rep.). 
 195 See id. 
 196 Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 93, at 1451. 
 197 Id. at 1449. 
 198 Indeed, while CAFA’s counsel fees provisions may seem to take care of the 
Coupon Settlement Problem, this likely is not the case.  As Part IV.A, infra, argues, 
attorney’s fees restrictions alone, whether successful or not at achieving the diminu-
tion of exorbitant fees, are not sufficient to guarantee substantive relief to absent 
class members. 
 199 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 3(a), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(e) (West 2007). 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 31 (2005). 
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adequate” actually means.  Commentators have acknowledged that 
this standard adds nothing substantively to judges’ settlement review 
hearings; Rule 23(e) already governs under the same standard.203
Historically lax judicial scrutiny over proposed coupon settle-
ments204 and CAFA’s replication205 of the Rule 23(e) judicial scrutiny 
standard206 yields an ominous result: CAFA’s admirable goals crumble 
upon an insufficient judicial oversight mechanism because it will not 
sufficiently alter the status quo.  A thorough analysis of the statutory 
provisions and practical ramifications of the Act confirms that this is 
likely the case. 
IV. CAFA’S SUBSTANTIVE SHORTCOMINGS 
A. CAFA’s Attorney’s Fees Provisions Will Not Function  
as Well as Intended 
While many commentators expect CAFA’s limitations on massive 
attorney’s fees pursuant to a coupon settlement to have a profound 
effect on class action abuse,207 potential loopholes in the fees provi-
sion will allow clever class attorneys and defendants to win the day 
over CAFA.  Careful scrutiny of the Act makes a number of plausible 
detours around the legislation’s purported protections easily identifi-
able.  These obscure escape hatches are reviewed below.208
First, CAFA does not explicitly mandate that attorney’s fees be 
based upon a percentage of the aggregate coupon redemption.209  At-
torneys may be able to craft coupon settlements similar to those that 
occurred pre-CAFA, while taking home a sizable fee (though perhaps 
not as sizable as a percentage of the coupon offering), thus inflicting 
the same substantive harm on class members.  Specifically, while  
§ 1712(a) may seem to mandate that fees must be calculated as a per-
centage of actually redeemed coupons, the subsection merely com-
mands that fees that are attributable to the award of coupons be calcu-
 203 See, e.g., MOORE ET AL., supra note 34, ¶ 23.164; Klonoff & Herrman, supra note 
101, at 1704. 
 204 See supra Part II.B. 
 205 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(e). 
 206 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
 207 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 69, at 185; Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 93, at 
1450. 
 208 The dilemmas raised in this section are largely dependent on the infirmity of 
the § 1712(e) backstop.  In other words, practical problems with CAFA’s fees provi-
sion are dependent on the inadequate judicial scrutiny provision, which is discussed 
in Part IV.B, infra. 
 209 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(a); see also Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 11, 15. 
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lated based upon the actual redemption amount.210  Nothing in  
§ 1712(a) specifically prevents attorneys from utilizing a lodestar with 
a multiplier system of fee calculation.211  In other words, the plain 
meaning of the Act would seem to allow attorneys to choose between 
the percentage and lodestar methods.212  Alternatively, even if  
§ 1712(a) is interpreted to mandate the percentage method, class at-
torneys will merely structure the settlement to include some sort of 
injunctive relief, thereby moving the proposed settlement under the 
purview of § 1712(b).213  Thus, simply by adding a request for injunc-
tive relief to the complaint, even if such a remedy would not provide 
an adequate solution, class counsel may well be able to circumvent 
the percentage method. 
The practical implication of class counsel’s ability to choose the 
fee calculation method is fairly evident—while class counsel’s fees 
may be restricted somewhat under the percentage method, nothing 
holds them to this fee arrangement.  Thus, attorneys may be willing 
to settle on a lower (though sizable) fee, based on the lodestar with a 
multiplier method, in order to structure a quick settlement with a de-
fendant that calls for unjust coupon relief to absent class members.  
Supporting this position, Professor Coffee asserts that the “lodestar 
formula enables collusion to occur on an implicit, rather than ex-
plicit, basis.”214  Once the time expended on a case justifies a fee that 
approaches a number likely to be earned under the percentage 
method, the class counsel has an incentive to accept a settlement of-
fer from the defendant, irrespective of the substantive remedy of-
fered to absent class members.215  Because attorney’s fees are time-
sensitive calculations under the lodestar approach, Coffee argues that 
collusion is built into the settlement negotiations: “under the lodestar 
 210 Id. 
 211 See Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 11.  In his analysis, Professor Rubenstein ar-
gues that § 1712 may seem to compel the percentage method whenever coupons are 
used.  Id.  However, given the language of § 1712(a) (“attributable to the [coupon] 
award,” as opposed to in all circumstances), as well as the rest of § 1712, Professor 
Rubenstein argues that the percentage method is only compelled if the award is to 
be calculated based on the coupon offering.  Id. 
 212 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(a). 
 213 Indeed, § 1712(b)(2) specifically provides that “nothing in this subsection shall 
be construed to prohibit the application of a lodestar with a multiplier method of 
determining attorney’s fees.”  Id. § 1712(b); see also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 30–31 
(2005). 
 214 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Eco-
nomic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 717 (1986). 
 215 See supra notes 48–68 and accompanying text. 
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formula, actual collusion is replaced by structural collusion.”216  Thus, 
under the lodestar method, the concerns underlying the potential for 
collusive settlement offerings217 remain intact. 
On the other hand, use of the post-CAFA percentage method 
may decrease the incentives for class counsel to put significant time 
into a case to arrive at a coupon settlement that provides adequate 
recovery to absent class members.  Class counsel might now be in-
spired to throw together lawsuits and settlements that result in cou-
pons that are in fact beneficial to class members (such that they will 
be redeemed), but are worth far less than the actual value of the 
claim.  Thus, class counsel can put little time into a case and structure 
a settlement that provides a real benefit to class members, though far 
less than the potential value of the case.  Consequently, counsel will 
receive a fairly significant fee (dwarfing the limited time invested), 
and the settlement will bargain away absent class members’ rights to 
bring an individual or class claim in the future that would actually 
fully compensate them for the harm they suffered. 
Under either calculation method, CAFA’s fees-limiting provi-
sions do nothing to guarantee sufficient substantive relief to class 
members, but instead could be the catalyst for unscrupulous attor-
neys to compose the same inadequate coupon settlements, garnering 
them a handsome fee (acutely disproportionate to individual class 
members’ recovery) and providing defendants with a low-cost global 
solution to their litigation.  In essence, CAFA was structured with an 
ill-advised tunnel vision toward attorney’s fees.  The Act’s reforms fo-
cus strictly on the means (attorney’s fees) and not the ends (fair relief 
to class members) of CAFA’s objectives.  Because the means do not 
adequately enforce a substantively just end, the provisions are ineffec-
tive. 
Another problem that could arise is CAFA’s failure to define the 
meaning of “coupon.”218  This could pose a problem when class at-
torneys argue that the proposed settlement does not even fall under 
the realm of § 1712.  While the Act clearly applies to non-cash awards 
that call for specified discounts on the defendant’s products or ser-
vices,219 in-kind settlements could be structured in a variety of ways in 
an attempt to dodge CAFA’s limitations.  For instance, “[w]ould fre-
quent flyer miles in a settlement with an airline[] be a coupon set-
 216 Coffee, supra note 215, at 718. 
 217 See supra notes 48–68 and accompanying text. 
 218 Klonoff & Herrman, supra note 101, at 1700 & n.22. 
 219 Id. at 1700. 
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tlement?”220  What about a “fluid recovery” settlement, where a taxi 
company agrees to reduce fares in the long term?221  Given the open-
ended statutory phrasing, it is unclear how much wiggle room class 
attorneys have to collusively construct settlements with defendants in 
order to circumvent the statute.  If courts begin to construe “coupon” 
narrowly, then there is a high probability that CAFA will not apply to 
creative settlements where non-cash, non-coupon awards are offered 
to class members.  Thus, the fees limitations may well prove to be 
avoidable, opening the door for the same substantive abuses, poten-
tially solidifying absent class members’ historical position as easy tar-
gets for abuse. 
Lastly, another reason CAFA’s fees provisions are insufficient is 
that the Act does not unconditionally bar usage restrictions222 on cou-
pons.223  Calculating attorneys and defendants may be able to struc-
ture theoretically high-value settlements that are fair enough to pass 
judicial scrutiny224 and are appealing enough for class members to 
redeem them, thus inflating attorney’s fees under CAFA, yet are re-
strictive enough to prevent class members from actually using or 
wanting to use the coupon, thus driving the defendant’s actual costs 
down.225  By placing limitations on the use of the coupons, attorneys 
admittedly do increase the risk of the settlement being rejected.  
However, given the possible return of a facially valuable yet practically 
unworthy solution, the possibility exists that use restrictions may be-
come a larger part of the coupon settlement debate. 
Given these practical concerns surrounding CAFA’s attorney’s 
fees provisions, the Act should have incorporated a strong and prin-
cipled judicial standard for review, rather than merely reiterating the 
same standard that was ineffective in constraining pre-CAFA coupon 
settlement abuses.  However, Congress failed to equip federal district 
 220 See id. 
 221 Stan Karasi, The Role of Fluid Recovery in Consumer Product Litigation: Kraus v. 
Trinity Management Service, 90 CAL. L. REV. 959, 970–72 (2002); see also Daar v. Yel-
low Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 746 (Cal. 1967) (discussing a preference for settlements 
allowing injured parties to recover actual overpayments to taxicabs).   
 222 See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text. 
 223 See generally Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 3(a), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1711–1715 
(West 2007).  As this Part discusses, § 1712 addresses only the problem of excessive 
attorney’s fees in proposed settlements, as well as the judicial scrutiny of the pro-
posed settlement overall, but does not specifically address (and therefore does not 
directly or indirectly prohibit outright) use restrictions on coupons offered in a set-
tlement.  See id. 
 224 As will be discussed in Part IV.B., infra, this is a far cry from an impossible 
proposition. 
 225 See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text. 
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judges with the necessary arsenal to prevent substantively harmful 
coupon settlements.  This detail could prove to have an enormous 
impact on the class action landscape. While the Act purports to sub-
stantively benefit class members by tying attorney’s fees to the actual 
benefit from the settlement derived by class members, the potentially 
inadequate provisions allow the destruction of a fundamental guaran-
tee of substantive relief for absent class members.  CAFA places too 
much emphasis on the easily avoided market mechanism designed to 
rein in exploitation.  Completely absent from the statute is a backup 
restriction stated in more flexible terms—a specific directive to 
judges to apply more exacting scrutiny to coupon settlement propos-
als. 
Furthermore, because of the history of abuse with class actions 
in general and coupon settlements in particular,226 even if the attor-
ney’s fees provisions are successful in limiting exorbitant legal com-
pensation, the provisions do nothing to protect class members, ab-
sent the intuitive presumption that class attorneys will drive up the 
value (and therefore the redemption rate and attorney’s fee) of the 
coupon offering.  However, this is unsupported conjecture.  There is 
no reason to believe that class counsel will now refrain from collud-
ing with defendants to maximize their personal gain while leaving the 
absent class members hanging by the wayside.  CAFA’s attorney’s fees 
restrictions erect a modest impediment to that incentive structure, 
but one that is relatively easy to avoid, absent a meaningful back-end 
restriction on substitute arrangements with the same practical effect.  
Therefore, a stronger judicial scrutiny standard should be substituted 
to provide for the fundamental guarantee of substantive relief to class 
members.227
B. CAFA’s Judicial Scrutiny Provision Ineffectively Guarantees 
Substantive Relief 
As discussed briefly above,228 CAFA mandates proposed coupon 
settlements be approved upon a written finding that the settlement is 
“fair, reasonable, and adequate to class members.”229  This is substan-
tively identical to the standard in Rule 23(e).230  Given that the judi-
cial review of proposed coupon settlements was patently insufficient 
 226 See supra Part II.B. 
 227 See infra Part IV.B. 
 228 See supra notes 22–25, 200–05 and accompanying text. 
 229 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 3(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (West 2007). 
 230 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
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to prevent abuse before CAFA,231 there is no reason whatsoever to be-
lieve that merely reiterating the identical judicial review standard will 
magically make the provision effective in the post-CAFA world.  Con-
gress’s mere reincantation of the Rule 23(e) standard that left abuse 
unchecked creates a gaping hole in the legislation. 
Although substantial commentary argues that the fairness in-
quiry adequately protected absent class members before CAFA and is 
therefore suitable for judicial review after the passage of the Act,232 
considerable scholarly and empirical evidence suggests that judicial 
scrutiny of coupon settlements in both state and federal courts was 
entirely inadequate,233 given the upsurge of fundamentally unjust set-
tlements being approved prior to CAFA’s ratification.234  While most 
every scholar would agree that judicial approval of coupon settle-
ments in state courts was the aggravating condition that precipitated 
CAFA’s Class Action Consumer Bill of Rights,235 a significant debate 
exists whether federal adjudicators are aptly prepared to protect ab-
sent class members in the post-CAFA world.  For instance, the U.S. 
Chamber for Legal Reform argues that because federal judges are 
appointed for life236 and do not need to “refill . . . campaign cof-
fers”237 for re-election bids, federal judges have a greater predisposi-
tion for rejecting unfair coupon settlements.238  The result, the 
Chamber argues, is that because federal courts are more likely to 
critically scrutinize proposed coupon settlements, absent class mem-
bers are more likely to receive relief proportional to the size of their 
injury (and their attorney’s fee).239
 231 See supra Part II.B. 
 232 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14 (2005) (arguing that “state court judges are 
less careful than their federal court counterparts about applying procedural re-
quirements that govern class actions”); A Pattern of Abuse, supra note 142, at 5–6. 
 233 See Buckner, supra note 25, at 200–01; Leslie, supra note 76, at 1070. 
 234 See supra Part II.B. 
 235 See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4), 119 
Stat. 4, 5 (2005) (revealing congressional findings that state courts were harming the 
national class action system). 
 236 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 237 A Pattern of Abuse, supra note 141, at 6. 
 238 Id. at 5. 
 239 Id. at 6.  The Chamber of Legal Reform supports this contention by citing nu-
merous cases in which state courts approved an unfair coupon settlement, as well as 
several cases in which federal courts rejected substantively inadequate coupon set-
tlement proposals.  See id. at 6–7 (citing Levell v. Monsanto Research Corp., 191 
F.R.D. 543 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 157 F. 
Supp. 2d 561 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Sheppard v. Consol. Edison Co., No. 94-CV-403 (JG), 
2000 LEXIS 33313540 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Polar Int’l Brokerage Corp. v. Reeve, 187 
F.R.D. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). 
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The Senate Judiciary Committee echoes this sentiment, asserting 
that federal judges have access to the resources necessary to provide 
adequate protection, and thus are more apt to consistently and thor-
oughly examine proposed settlements.240  This may be true, but it is 
not a complete answer.  Just as the attorney’s fees provision provides 
some protection, the greater capacity of the federal courts to police 
unfair settlements is likely of some help to absent class members—but 
it is not enough.  The Act’s echoing of the pre-CAFA settlement stan-
dards is a crucial missed opportunity to ratchet up scrutiny of coupon 
settlements that may evade the relatively crude attorney’s fees market 
mechanism.  Congress could have and should have provided more 
specific guidance to district courts in reviewing coupon settlements so 
as to provide a far more effective basis to rein in abuse. 
Moreover, despite academic and political assertions that judicial 
review of proposed settlements in federal fora is perfectly sufficient to 
protect class members,241 other scholars paint a more ominous pic-
ture.  For example, Professor Christopher Leslie argues that on the 
whole, both federal and state judges are guilty of the same improper 
approval of inequitable coupon settlements.242  He argues that judi-
cial ratification of unfair settlements crafted by the adversarial parties 
is caused by a number of systemic and external factors.243  First, the 
lack of a well-defined standard for “fair, reasonable, and adequate” 
encourages inconsistent review.244  Second, proposed coupon settle-
ments are surrounded by “coupon noise,”245 which makes it extremely 
difficult for judges to accurately determine the true value of the set-
tlement.246  This inherent difficulty makes an approval of an unfair 
settlement more likely.247  Third, systemic pressures, such as an over-
whelming desire to produce a settlement and unnecessary deference 
 240 S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14 (2005). 
 241 See supra notes 233–41 and accompanying text. 
 242 Leslie, supra note 76, at 1054–55 (discussing Rule 23(e) and judicial presump-
tion of coupon settlement adequacy). 
 243 Id. at 1053–70. 
 244 Id. at 1054–55.  Professor Leslie discusses courts’ interpretations of process and 
substantive review requirements, noting that notwithstanding these construals, courts 
often simply presume adequacy.  Id. (discussing In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up 
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 796 (3d Cir. 1995); City of Detroit v. 
Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust 
Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 312 (N.D. Ga. 1993)). 
 245 Id. at 1055–56.  For example, such coupon noise includes red herrings created 
by class counsel and the defendant which make the settlement look more valuable.  
Id. at 1059. 
 246 Id. at 1055. 
 247 See id. 
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to class counsel, leads to judicial trepidation for rejecting unjust set-
tlements.248  Finally, he argues that judges often consider certain case-
specific factors, such as a defendant’s weak financial position, in justi-
fying approval of the proposed coupon settlement.249  Professor Leslie 
concludes his analysis by asserting that “[u]ltimately, judicial review 
of a proposed coupon-based settlement provides insufficient protec-
tion to the class against collusion between the defendant and class 
counsel. Courts generally rubber-stamp proposed settlements, so bad 
settlements often survive judicial scrutiny.”250  There is simply no in-
dication that Professor Leslie’s pre-CAFA concerns will not continue 
to manifest themselves unabated without stronger statutory protec-
tion. 
Another scholar, Professor Carol Buckner, maintains similar 
criticisms of judicial review of class action settlements.251  She argues 
that judges in both federal and state fora often give only “perfunctory 
review” of coupon settlements, resulting in inadequate protection of 
absent class members.252  Furthermore, in order to clear crowded 
dockets, the judges ignore self-dealing and approve proposed settle-
ments without any real inquiry into the actual valuation of the cou-
pon settlement.253  Professor Buckner continues her critique of in-
adequate settlement review by arguing that judges pay even less 
attention in the settlement context than they do in certifying a class 
action.254
Both sides to the current debate seem to be fairly meritorious.  
However, even conceding the fact that federal judges are more likely 
than their state court counterparts to closely scrutinize and reject a 
substantively unfair proposed coupon settlement does not rectify the 
underlying problem: the standard under § 1712(e) is simply not 
 248 Leslie, supra note 76, at 1060–66. 
 249 Id. at 1067–68. 
 250 Id. at 1070.  Professor Leslie discusses In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck 
Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55 F.3d 768, 818 (3d Cir. 1995).  In that case, 
the district court approved a wholly inequitable coupon settlement that gave class 
members a coupon toward a future purchase of a GM vehicle.  Id.  Professor Leslie 
uses this case as a typical example of a situation in which a federal district judge ap-
proved an unjust coupon settlement.  Id. at 1069. 
 251 See Buckner, supra note 25, at 201. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. at 202; see also Mullenix, supra note 25, at 1716–17 (“[N]either the parties 
nor the court has [any] special interest in extensively probing adequacy in the set-
tlement context, even in the shadow of a potential collateral attack” because typically, 
“the parties are aligned in interest in obtaining the court's approval of the settle-
ment.”). 
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strong enough to filter out many inequitable coupon settlements or 
to provide guidance to federal courts so that they can make a more 
specific assessment of the propriety of the proposed settlement.255  
Given the jurisdictional expansion of CAFA,256 even more interstate 
class actions will end up in federal court, thereby increasing the like-
lihood of proposed coupon settlements and clogging federal judges’ 
dockets (more so than the current federal backlog).  This will result 
in added pressure on federal judges to dispose of cases by approving 
settlements to which the adversaries have already agreed.  As a result, 
even if federal judges were more inclined than state court judges to 
reject unfair pre-CAFA coupon settlements, they will be much more 
likely today to approve such settlement proposals.  Congress did not 
have the foresight to prevent this practical reality from occurring.  At 
the very least, it is unclear whether federal judges are likely to ratify 
unfair coupon settlements, precisely because most of the unfair cou-
pon settlements were being approved in state court before CAFA’s 
passage.  Because of this, a stricter scrutiny standard should have 
been incorporated into the legislation to protect the continued viabil-
ity of the American class action mechanism. 
As an intriguing counterpoint, Professor Coffee believes that 
“any system that depends upon extraordinary vigilance by judges is 
inferior to one that by structural redesign minimizes the existing in-
centives for collusion.”257 While this contention is certainly colorable 
on a theoretical level, his vision for a utopian class action system in 
which class counsel have minimal countervailing economic incen-
tives258 has yet to come to fruition.  As a practical matter, heightened 
judicial scrutiny is both necessary and appropriate to provide suffi-
cient redress to the current problem.  As Coffee acknowledges, 
“[a]lthough courts have long recognized th[e] danger [of collusive 
settlement practices] and have developed some procedural safe-
guards intended to prevent [such] settlements, these reforms are far 
from adequate to the task.”259  Rather than redesigning the entire 
class action framework, a more sensible solution to the Coupon Set-
tlement Problem would be to devise a procedural safeguard that ac-
tually works.  As this Comment argues, enacting a more rigorous ju-
dicial review provision would do just that. 
 255 See supra notes 69–85 and accompanying text. 
 256 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §§ 4–5, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(d), 1453 (West 
2007); see Part III.A, supra. 
 257 Coffee, supra note 48, at 237. 
 258 See supra notes 48–68 and accompanying text. 
 259 Coffee, supra note 214, at 714.   
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By focusing almost entirely on attorney’s fees-based solutions, 
CAFA does not solve the underlying problem: absent class members 
with legitimate claims will continue to walk away with coupons that 
provide little or no benefit to them, while providing large (though 
CAFA-limited) fees to class counsel.  Furthermore, defendants will 
still retain the ability to easily escape liability, often without the incen-
tive to change wrongful or tortious behavior.  Indeed, one commen-
tator maintains that “it is unlikely that anything in CAFA will seriously 
curtail the use of coupon settlements. . . . The substantive provisions 
barely change current practice.”260  Under the current scrutiny 
scheme, judges may well continue to rubber stamp proposed coupon 
settlements, and CAFA will not have lived up to its name.  Therefore, 
the judicial scrutiny standard should be strengthened to guarantee 
substantive relief to class members. 
V. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
A. Rebuttable Presumption Against Coupon Settlements 
Given the inadequate provision for proper judicial review of 
proposed coupon settlements,261 CAFA should be amended to refor-
mulate the test for judicial review of proposed coupon settlements. 
Given the history of abuse262 and unwarranted judicial approval of in-
equitable coupon settlements, an amendment to CAFA would pro-
vide a uniform and efficient solution to the problem.263  Specifically, 
CAFA should be amended to provide a two-prong test that presump-
tively invalidates all coupon settlements, absent a showing of a bona 
fide rationale for utilizing such a solution, and that the particular set-
tlement proposal does in fact provide adequate relief to absent class 
members. 
The first prong would integrate an initial rebuttable presump-
tion against all coupon settlements.  By presumptively invalidating 
every such proposed settlement, the American class action system will 
realize two improvements.  First, far fewer coupon settlements will be 
proposed at all, increasing the likelihood that money damages or 
 260 Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 17.  Professor Rubenstein does not address the 
judicial scrutiny provision of CAFA, but merely contends in conclusory terms that 
parties will continue to construct coupon settlements.  Id. 
 261 See supra Part II.B. 
 262 See supra Part II.B. 
 263 While a legislative amendment to CAFA would provide for more certain and 
uniform outcomes, federal judges could conceivably interpret the already codified 
terms of the Act to incorporate the test proposed in this Comment.  A policy debate 
about which method is preferable, however, is outside the scope of this Comment. 
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some tangible benefit will accrue to class members (or that non-
meritorious claims will not be brought in the first place).  Second, 
because most often coupon settlements occur in a context in which 
the claim is either dubious or at least not likely to win at trial,264 the 
presumption will naturally encourage defendants to litigate claims 
that they are likely to win.  In other words, if because of the presump-
tion against coupon settlements, class counsel and defendants cannot 
structure such a settlement in an unmeritorious case, defendants will 
be more likely to contest ill-founded claims, thus dissuading class 
counsel from bringing such claims. 
While not “strict in theory, fatal in fact,”265 overcoming the pre-
sumption against coupon settlements should be an exceptionally dif-
ficult task.  Given the concerns precipitating CAFA’s coupon settle-
ment section,266 only those proposed settlements in which there is a 
fundamentally sound rationale for instituting coupons in lieu of 
money damages should judges even consider upholding the settle-
ment.  Such instances might include situations where the class mem-
bers’ injuries are so small that a coupon would actually be more help-
ful to individual class members than mere pennies in damages, or 
when a class is so large that economies of scale shrink the costs of 
producing coupons to an amount that is theoretically beneficial to 
the collective parties involved.  Under this “sound rationale” inquiry, 
both class counsel and defendant must prove to the court that, in the 
abstract, a coupon settlement would be more advantageous to both 
the defendants and the plaintiff class than a simple cash award. 
Once the class counsel and defendant have collectively con-
vinced the district judge that the high presumptive hurdle has been 
overcome, a case-specific substantive prong must be met.  This prong 
would be in line with the current mandate of § 1712(e), but would 
provide a more specific directive to district judges.  Under this com-
ponent of the test, the parties involved must prove to the judge that 
the particular coupon settlement proposal is structured in a way that 
 264 See Hantler & Norton, supra note 11, at 1354–56 (discussing that more and 
more defendants have begun taking a stand against unmeritorious class action law-
suits). 
 265 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978) (discussing strict 
scrutiny in the Equal Protection context).  This Comment’s proposal does not sug-
gest importation of “strict scrutiny” as an analogue to constitutional review standards, 
but for descriptive purposes refers to the proposed test as implementing “strict” or 
“stricter” scrutiny over proposed coupons settlements.  See Leslie, supra note 76, at 
1077–81 (utilizing the phrase “strict scrutiny” in reference to more demanding judi-
cial review of proposed coupon settlements); see also infra notes 269–73 and accom-
panying text. 
 266 See supra Parts III.B, IV. 
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is actually beneficial to individual class members.  Factors to be con-
sidered could include the relative benefit to class members compared 
to the harm alleged; the absolute dollar value (in coupons) that indi-
vidual class members would receive; the existence of any secondary 
market for such a coupon offering; the amount of use restrictions on 
the coupons; and the existence of limitations on redeeming the cou-
pons, among others.267  A district court should approve the settlement 
only if the parties overcome the presumptive hurdle and demonstrate 
that (1) the coupon settlement at issue is theoretically a better tool 
than money damages in this instance and (2) the particular coupon 
offering actually benefits individual class members. 
This strict scrutiny test is grounded in theory.  Professor Leslie 
endorsed stricter judicial scrutiny of proposed coupon settlements 
prior to the enactment of CAFA.268  By compelling district judges to 
take a microscopic look at a coupon settlement proposal, the pro-
posed test would manifest three distinct advantages.269  First, “strict 
scrutiny of coupon terms is a more precise tool than a uniform rejec-
tion of coupon settlements.”270  Second, enhanced scrutiny of a cou-
pon settlement would not drastically change what reviewing judges 
are theoretically supposed to do—that is, take a close look at the fair-
ness of the settlement to the class.271  Third, Professor Leslie argued 
 267 See, e.g., Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975).  The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit has adopted a nine-factor test for reviewing the ade-
quacy of a proposed coupon settlement: 
(1) the complexity and duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of 
the class to the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings; (4) the 
risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6) 
the risks of maintaining a class action; (7) the ability of the defendants 
to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the 
settlement in light of the best recovery; and (9) the range of reason-
ableness of the settlement in light of all the attendant risks of litigation. 
Id.; see also In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 
F.3d 768, 806–18 (3d Cir. 1995) (analyzing a district court’s approval of a coupon 
settlement).  A plausible argument can be made that the Third Circuit test is suffi-
cient to ensure adequate review of proposed coupon settlements, thus rendering the 
presumptive invalidity of coupon settlements suggested by this Comment unneces-
sary.  However, given the concerns of the Coupon Settlement Problem analyzed in 
Part III.B, supra, the Third Circuit’s nine-factor test would be put to better use in con-
junction with this Comment’s proposed solution.  In other words, the Third Circuit 
test should only be incorporated once the first prong of the proposed test—
presumption of invalidity—has been satisfied. 
 268 Leslie, supra note 76, at 1077–81. 
 269 Id. at 1078–79. 
 270 Id. at 1078. 
 271 Id.; see, e.g., Reynolds v. Benefit Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(The “[d]istrict judge in the settlement phase of a class action suit [is] a fiduciary of 
the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of fi-
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that mandating higher judicial scrutiny would induce judges to take a 
more proactive approach to the structuring of a fair coupon settle-
ment.272
This test is not merely the current rule273 turned on its head.  
While the second substantive prong of the test reflects a more specific 
application of the fairness inquiry that is supposed to be utilized in 
current § 1712(e) fairness hearings, the strong rebuttable presump-
tion against approval in the first prong of the proposed test would 
create a judicial strainer that will enhance the fundamental fairness 
of the class action system.  The proposed test recognizes that “no one 
can fairly argue that all coupon settlements are bad.”274  But it also 
understands that, given the history of the coupon settlement mecha-
nism,275 the majority of coupon settlements inherently work to the 
disadvantage of the individual class members, particularly absent class 
members.276
The practicality and efficacy of this Comment’s proposal is best 
demonstrated by applying it to a real-life case in which a coupon set-
tlement could have been implemented to the advantage of all parties 
involved in the action.  Shields v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.277 is such a 
case.  While the Senate Judiciary Committee decried Shields as a typi-
cal example of abusive coupon settlement practices,278 in fact no cou-
pons were ever proposed or issued.279  However, coupons could plau-
sibly have been offered to absent class members to provide them 
genuine substantive relief that had not yet caused them harm.  Simul-
taneously, Firestone would have procured global relief and been en-
ticed to repair its quasi-tortious conduct. 
duciaries.”).  This Comment’s proposed test adds to Professor Leslie’s analysis by 
providing a more systematic analytical framework for reviewing the merits of a set-
tlement, rather than suggesting “stricter scrutiny” in passing without proposing a 
concrete process for implementing such scrutiny.  See Leslie, supra note 76, at  
1077–81. 
 272 Leslie, supra note 76, at 1079–80. 
 273 See supra Part II.B. 
 274 Lisa M. Mezzetti & Whitney R. Case, The Use of “Coupon” and Other Non-Monetary 
Redress in Class Action Settlements, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1431, 1437 (2005). 
 275 See supra Part II.B. 
 276 See Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 93, at 1449. 
 277 No. E-0167637 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 31, 2002); see supra notes 135–36 and accompany-
ing text. 
 278 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 279 See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.  In lieu of coupons, Firestone 
agreed to revamp its tire designs and to develop a consumer education and aware-
ness campaign.  
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To overcome the presumption against coupon settlements and 
satisfy the first prong of this Comment’s proposed test, class counsel 
and Firestone attorneys could have successfully illustrated to the trial 
judge that there was, in fact, a bona fide rationale for using coupons 
as relief instead of individual cash awards.  First, awarding cash in a 
case where actual damages were prospective (as opposed to retro-
spective relief for harm that had already been incurred) would not 
guarantee that absent class members would actually utilize their 
award to remedy the problem.  In other words, in Shields, the prob-
lem was faulty tires; awarding cash to plaintiffs that had not yet been 
injured would not necessarily result in the replacement of that defec-
tive product.  Coupons, by contrast, would have ensured a solution to 
the problem that sparked the litigation in the first place by mandat-
ing new tires be purchased with coupons, and thus removing the un-
safe product from the market.  Second, the potentially large substan-
tive value accruing to class members by providing a means to procure 
replacement tires very well may substantially outweigh any individual 
cash award.  Due to the size of a nationwide class, a cash settlement 
would likely only provide a few dollars in relief, whereas a coupon 
could have provided a larger value (both in terms of dollar amount 
and peace of mind)280 to individual class members.  Finally, the 
economies of scale of producing coupons for a large class could have 
allowed Firestone to adequately compensate class members while at 
the same time avoiding a more wallet-damaging cash settlement.281  In 
sum, Shields provides an ideal example for a theoretically sound justi-
fication for using coupons instead of cash to compensate class mem-
bers, thus overcoming the presumption against coupon settlements 
that this Comment suggests. 
Once Firestone and class counsel convinced the trial judge that 
coupons were theoretically more beneficial to class members than a 
money award, structuring a specific coupon settlement would have 
been a relatively simple task.  For example, suppose a single faulty tire 
cost sixty dollars.  Structuring a coupon worth fifteen dollars off the 
purchase of a new tire (guaranteed to be safe thanks to Firestone’s 
promise to perform a full review of its tire design)282 may well have 
provided class members adequate substantive relief in relation to the 
 280 “Peace of mind” in this context refers to the relief felt when a consumer knows 
that her faulty tires were replaced with safe tires. 
 281 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 282 Firestone agreed to redesign the tires as part of the actual settlements.  Shields, 
No. E-0167637 (Tex. Dist. Ct. July 31, 2002); see supra note 135 and accompanying 
text. 
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harm alleged.  Furthermore, the coupon offering could have been 
structured so as to allow recipients to aggregate multiple coupons 
depending on how many faulty tires they had purchased. 
Obviously, the attractiveness of any particular coupon settlement 
under this test would depend on the precise terms and limitations, if 
any, of the settlement agreement, but the point is simple: in those 
situations where coupons can help provide fair relief more effectively 
than a cash settlement, the structuring of the actual settlement is 
relatively straightforward.  Here, where a nationwide class owns a po-
tentially harmful product that has not yet generated any actual dam-
age, coupons that induce those plaintiffs to replace the product at a 
sufficiently reduced price would provide the most effective solution.  
Under the right settlement structure, a coupon settlement could pro-
vide a more effective solution than a cash settlement because, under 
the tire hypothetical, the injured class members are now in need of 
new tires.  By forcing the defendant to fix the problem, and by allow-
ing the plaintiffs to get what they wanted in the first place, everyone is 
better off.  Furthermore, allocating a settlement with coupons instead 
of cash could protect a relatively less culpable defendant from griev-
ous economic harm by allowing for product discounts rather than 
massive damage awards, yet still compensating plaintiffs for their in-
juries.  The specifics of a settlement would be worked out on a case-
by-case basis, and if adequate under the second prong of the test, the 
reviewing court could certify the settlement under CAFA.  Running 
Shields through this Comment’s proposed gauntlet shows that CAFA 
can indeed accomplish its objectives by adjusting the standard of re-
view for proposed coupon settlements. 
A congressional amendment to CAFA incorporating this test 
would best fix the inadequacies of the current Act.  Given the histori-
cal abuse of the class action system through use of the coupon set-
tlement mechanism,283 in addition to the predisposition of judges to 
summarily accept a proposed settlement,284 the text of the Act should 
expressly mandate that reviewing judges initially presume a coupon 
settlement to be inadequate, absent a showing that a coupon offering 
could be more beneficial to the class, and that such a settlement ac-
tually achieves fundamental fairness.  A congressional amendment 
would provide consistent and uniform assessment of proposed cou-
pon settlements.285
 283 See supra Part II.B. 
 284 See supra Part III.B. 
 285 While a legislative amendment to correct the Act’s deficiencies would provide 
an effective and uniform result, in the absence of congressional action pursuant to 
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B. Other Proposed Solutions 
Three competing solutions exist to solve inadequate review of 
coupon settlements.  First, CAFA could be amended to ban all cou-
pon settlements outright.286  However, this solution can be rapidly 
dispelled because such a drastic reform disregards the possibility of a 
fundamentally fair coupon settlement.287  Second, judges could re-
quire a minimum coupon redemption rate.288  However, this proposal 
is an ineffective tool because 
[a]ny solution that relies on manipulating the defendants’ incen-
tive to increase redemption rates will run into the problem of 
countervailing incentive.  Defendants still have a baseline incen-
tive to insure that settlement coupons do not confer value to the 
class at the defendants’ expense.  High redemption rates are not 
necessarily synonymous with valuable coupons.289
Finally, an interesting proposal to reform coupon settlement 
abuse is to mandate attorney’s compensation to be in the same form 
as the relief individual class members receive.290  While this proposal 
would truly align class counsel’s incentives with those of class mem-
bers, it would likely do so to the point of overkill—even if coupons 
were valuable to class members, a million coupons would likely not 
be of value to class counsel.  In other words, even if the coupons are 
of high value and class counsel could conceivably resell them on the 
open market, this proposed solution does not provide an efficient 
outcome.  In most instances, the limited value of the coupon would 
render the transaction costs prohibitive—the attorney would lack the 
ability to realize the full value of the coupon compensation.  The test 
proposed in this Comment more practically provides substantive 
value to class members in the first instance, instead of an inefficient 
and likely unworkable market incentive for attorneys to maximize 
their compensation. 
The proposal in this Comment would serve to equip federal dis-
trict judges reviewing proposed coupon settlements with a practical 
this Comment’s proposed test, courts could and should develop interpretations of 
CAFA’s “fair, reasonable, and adequate” standard that integrate this Comment’s 
proposal. 
 286 Leslie, supra note 76, at 1075–77. 
 287 Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 93, at 1445.  As presented in Part II.A, supra, 
the benefits of a fair coupon settlement include the provision of redress from injury, 
incentives to correct allegedly wrongful or tortious behavior, and the presentment of 
global peace avoiding duplicative litigation, among others.   
 288 Leslie, supra note 76, at 1081. 
 289 Id. at 1083. 
 290 Id. at 1086. 
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tool that would help the Class Action Fairness Act achieve its stated 
purpose.291  By initially mandating a strong rebuttable presumption 
against coupon settlements, abuse that has enveloped the class action 
landscape292 will be curtailed by an Act that has the potential to pro-
vide actual substantive relief to absent class members. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 has laudable intentions.  
Due to significant abuses of the class action mechanism throughout 
the 1990s,293 potential litigants who had been legitimately harmed 
were denied appropriate relief.294  With the proliferation of the cou-
pon settlement, class counsel and defendants took home all the bene-
fits, leaving the harmed class members with close to nothing, thus 
diminishing the effectiveness of and appreciation for the American 
judicial system.295  CAFA was designed to rectify the exploitation of a 
procedural mechanism that, when used properly, can provide valu-
able relief to aggrieved individuals that would not otherwise have the 
opportunity to litigate their claims.296 However, the Act does not go 
far enough.297  By mere reincantation of the same ineffective pre-
CAFA standard, the Act will allow unscrupulous attorneys to weave 
their way around the Act, and in the end, class members will continue 
to be left holding the bag (of coupons).298  By amending the Act to 
presumptively bar all coupon settlements, only the fair and just set-
tlements that provide real substantive value to absent class members 
will make it through the judicial filter.299  As President Bush acknowl-
edged, the Act has begun to make progress.300  However, “there’s still 
more [work] to do.”301  This work should come in the form of an 
overhaul of the judicial fairness inquiry over proposed coupon set-
tlements.  As a result, CAFA would provide a more successful funda-
 291 See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text. 
 292 See supra Part II.B. 
 293 See id. 
 294 See id. 
 295 See id. 
 296 See supra Part III. 
 297 See supra Part IV. 
 298 See supra Part IV.B. 
 299 See supra Part V. 
 300 Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, President Signs Class-
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (Feb. 18, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2005/02/20050218-11.html. 
 301 Id. 
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mental guarantee of actual substantive relief to absent class members, 
thus achieving its commendable objectives. 
 
